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Abstract-In this paper, the system-theoretic concept of controllability is applied to macroeconomic 
decision models. There are several forms of controllability which are of great relevance for the theory of 
economic policy, especially the concept of target path controllability (TPC). TPC means that a given set 
of instrument (control) variables are capable of steering a given set of target variables exactly along 
arbitrarily selected time paths. The authors analyse whether TPC can hold in Keynesian-type models with 
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve for the labour market. They demonstrate that, in the long-run 
version of the model (where capacity effects are taken into consideration), TPC is possible-even under 
rational inflationary expectations. Without capacity effects, i.e. in the short-run case, TPC (in the global 
sense.) neither holds under rational nor under adaptive expectations. In the short-run model only local 
path controllability (like target point controllability) can hold. This shows that a long-term orientated 
economic policy may be more effective than a short-term policy. The authors discuss also the concept of 
“natural output” in the framework of “capacity” models with sluggish wage adjustment. They 
demonstrate that there is no point in defining “natural output” as in McCallum’s and Barro’s long-run 
models. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the relationship between the system-theoretic concept of controllability and 
different assumptions on the formation of expectations. We analyse the problem how the transition 
from &hoc to rational expectations changes the controllability properties of macroeconomic policy 
models. It is well-known that macroeconomic theory has changed profoundly since the beginning 
of the 1970s. In macroeconomic theory, a great part of this transformation is connected with the 
formulation of the “rational expectations theory”. One of the explanations of the stagtIation 
phenomenon (i.e. the simultaneous occurrence of unemployment and inflation) led to the fact that 
there is a learning process in the economy and part of that learning process centres around the 
formation of expectations. A most striking result of this new approach was that aggregate demand 
management cannot alter the level of real output even in the short run because the private sector 
is capable of forecasting the effects of stabilization policy immediately. The proposition of 
ineffectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy is, of course, a big challenge to the traditional theory 
of economic policy, which implicitly depends on the assumption of an invariant connection between 
the instrument variables and the target variables of an economic system. If the economic agents 
anticipate economic policy correctly, the laws of motion of the system will perhaps be transmuted 
even in the short run. And, indeed, since the beginning of the 70s things didn’t work the way they 
used to. The widely accepted Phillips curve, which suggested an invariant inverse unemployment- 
inflation relationship (see, for example Dornbusch and Fischer [l]), began to shift in an unforeseen 
way, evidently because the policy makers attempted to exploit this trade-off between real output 
(resp. unemployment) and the inflation rate, and the private sector adjusted its expectations to this 
situation. 
Hence, there is now a widespread opinion among economists that traditional demand manage- 
ment is not very effective to stabilize real output and employment (however, it may still be used 
to control the inflation rate). 
In this paper we will try to contribute to the problem of whether the transition from adaptive 
to rational expectations always deteriorates the controllability properties of an economic system 
and especially leads to policy impotence. 
tThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
C.A.M.W.A. 1816-7-J 617 
618 H. KUHN and H.-W. WOHLTMANS 
Controllability of a static resp. dynamic economic model involves the possibility to attain any 
combination of values resp. time functions in the target space by means of a given set of instrument 
(control) variables (see, for example, Preston and Pagan [2]). In other words. the controllability 
approach in economics asks whether a given set of policy instruments is capable of guiding a given 
set of target variables in an independent manner. Technically, the term controllability means that 
there exists an onto mapping (surjective mapping) from instrument o target space, i.e. any given 
element in the target space is reachable by at least one element in the space of instrument variables. 
The concept of controllability plays a great role in the quantitative theory of economic policy 
in so far as a solution of a$xed-target policy problem exists if this important condition is fulfilled. 
The presence of rational expectations and subsequently a possible ineffectiveness to influence 
output and employment obviously means that real output is not controllable. For some years it 
was feared that the existence of rational expectations about the future of economic activity and 
governmental policy would convert any economic decision model into a non-controllable system. 
But further discussion showed (see, for example, Buiter [3]) that the assumption of rational 
expectations is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy neutrality and therefore non-controllabil- 
ity. In this paper we shall present a simple example of a model for the closed economy with 
alternative expectations hypotheses with which we can show that the transition from adaptive to 
rational expectations generally changes the structure resp. the controllability properties of the 
model but not as radically as it is often presumed. 
Before going to analyse the macro-model we will first discuss different forms of controllability 
which are of relevance for the theory of economic policy (Section 2). In Section 3 a short-run 
version of the macroeconomic model is discussed, whereas in Section 4 a long-run version of the 
model is considered. Section 5 criticizes the long-run version of the famous policy ineffectiveness 
theorem in the new classical macroeconomics. In Section 6 some conclusions are drawn from the 
obtained results. The mathematical Appendix of this paper contains two versions of the short-run 
and long-run decision model. 
2. CONTROLLABILITY CONCEPTS IN THE THEORY OF POLICY 
Since a policy model may be a static or dynamic system, we have to distinguish between static 
and dynamic controllability. For static models with m instrument (control) variables z,, . , . , z, and 
k target (output) variables ur, . . . , vk, controllability means that any arbitrary output combination 
v=(vi,..., tik)’ in the target space lQk can be realized (without time lag) by means of a suitable 
instrument combination z = (z,, . . . , z,)’ in the instrument space [Wm. This form of controllability 
is obviously a rather strong concept since it implies that any objective is achievable instantaneously 
and that the Tinbergen [4] condition (“number of instrument variables, m, greater than or equal 
to the number of target variables, k”) must hold. 
In a dynamic context we have to consider several forms of controllability. Broadly speaking the 
dynamic controllability approach asks whether a given set of instrument variables can guide a given 
set of target variables along arbitrarily selected time paths on a target interval I. We want to restrict 
the discussion to linear discrete-time dynamical systems of the following (state space) form: 
x, + , = Ax, + Ez, + Eu, (state equations), (1) 
u, = Cx, + Dz, + Fu, (output equations). (2) 
x, is an n-dimensional state vector, z, an m-dimensional instrument (control) vector, u, a 
k-dimensional target (output) vector and U, aj-dimensional uncontrollable data vector. A, B, C, 
D, E, and F are constant matrices of the appropriate dimensions. 
Dejinition 1 
The dynamic decision model (I), (2) is called dynamically controllable over T + 1 consecutive time 
periods if, for any given target path y: (t = 0, 1,2, . . . ), any initial state x0 and known time path 
u: of the data vector u there exist a finite adjustment time s 2 0, a sequence of controls z: 
(t = 0, 1,2, . . . ), and a sequence of corresponding state vectors x: = x* (t; x0, z*, u*) [satisfying 
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equation (l)] such that the corresponding target vector satisfies U, = u: for all t E I:= 
{s,s+l,..., s+T}. 
The set I is the so-called target interval. It consists of T + 1 elements (so that the length of I 
is T + 1) and is uniquely defined by the non-negative integers s and T. The adjustment ime s is 
also called the policy lead (Preston and Sieper [5]). The policy interval is given by the set 
{OJ)..., s,s+l,..., s + 7’) and consists of s + T + 1 periods. 
We now discuss several forms of dynamic controllability. Let us first consider the special case 
where the target interval consists of only one element (T = 0). In this case the concept of dynamic 
controllability is equivalent o target point controllability. A target point controllable system is a 
dynamic system for which any desired point v* in the target space lRk is attainable from any initial 
point u0 in finite time s. (Note that this is possible with a policy lead which is less than or equal 
to the number n of state variables.) In this case, even if the number of instrument variables, M, 
is smaller than the number of target variables, k, (i.e. for a non-Tinbergen model), this property 
occurs, because it is only necessary that the actual time path of the target vector u passes through 
the desired path v 7 ; it must not stay there thereafter. Only in the special case in which the desired 
target path is a stationary equilibrium of the dynamic system, i.e. (Z, is the n x n identity matrix) 
v;r=,_=C~+DZ+FE @:=(I,--A)-‘(ZE+Z%)), 
where the inputs z and u are constant over time, the economy can stay there for all t 2 s if target 
point controllability is given (Buiter and Gersovitz [6]). In all other cases, for a point controllable 
system it is generally not possible to follow an arbitrarily selected time path. Point controllability 
(also called complete controllability) is thus a very weak concept. But because ach complete (state) 
controllable system can be stabilized by a set of proportional feedback controls of the form (G is 
an m x n matrix of constant coefficients) 
z, = Gx,, 
nevertheless this property is very important for stabilization policy. 
In contrast to target point controllability the concept of target path controllability (T > 0) has 
attracted very little attention in economics as yet. For the theory of economic policy this concept 
is very useful because with a path controllable system the policy maker is able to follow any given 
target path on a whole time interval. Policy makers are not only interested in achieving desired 
target values but also keeping them on some desired time paths once achieved (Aoki [7]). Path 
controllability may be viewed as the more natural dynamic analogue of Tinbergen’s static 
controllability concept than the weaker concept of point controllability. 
There are two forms of target path controllability: global (in T) and local path controllability. 
In a globally path controllable system the length of the target interval is infinite so that-after some 
adjustment ime-a time path of the target vector of arbitrary length can be realized by means of 
a suitable sequence of the control vector z. In a locally path controllable system, on the other hand, 
the length of the target interval is bounded above and therefore the system can be steered exactly 
only for finite time intervals. 
Note that Tinbergen’s original condition for static controllability, i.e. “number of target variables 
less than or equal to the number of instrument variables” is also necessary for global but not 
necessary for local path controllability. For finite target intervals Z = Z(s, 2”) Tingergen’s counting 
rule has to be replaced by the weaker condition that the number of time-indexed target variables 
on the target interval (i.e. (T + 1)k) is less than or equal to the number of time-indexed instrument 
variables on the policy interval (i.e. (T + 1)m) which implies that target path controllability is also 
possible in a non-Tinbergen model (m < k). In such a model policy anticipation is necessary to 
compensate for instrument deficiencies (see Preston and Sieper [5] for more details). 
In a dynamic system with less “natural” instruments than targets there exists an upper bound 
for the length of the target interval (since the maximum effective degree of policy anticipation 
cannot be greater than the number n of state variables): the maximum length of the target interval, 
for which dynamic path controllability can hold in a non-Tinbergen model, is given by (cf. 
Wohltmann [8]) 
T* + 1 = [(n + T - m)/(k -m)]*, (3) 
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where t is the rank of the impact multiplier matrix D in (2) and where [(n + r - m)/(k - m)]* is 
the greatest integer less than or equal to (n + r - m)/(k - m). (Note that in Preston and Sieper 
[5, p. 2341, the upper bound for target path controllability in non-Tinbergen models is erroneously 
given by T+ 1 = [n/(k - m)]* which is greater than or equal to T* + 1. In their Proposition 9, T 
has to be replaced by T*.) 
Dejinition 2 
If the dynamical system (1), (2) is non-Tinbergen (m < k), it is called maximal controllable if it 
is target path controllable on the maximum target interval, i.e. on time intervals with length T* + 1, 
where T* + 1 is given by (3). 
It should be pointed out that the target path controllability (TPC) approach in the theory of 
economic policy is very different from the traditional optimization approach. The TPC approach 
deals withfixed target problems (where the adjustment costs of the instruments are neglected) while 
the optimization approach analysesflexible target problems (where the costs of using instruments 
usually are taken into consideration). 
The fixed target approach asks whether it is possible to achieve-after some finite adjustment 
time-a given target path perfectly while the flexible target approach is only interested in an 
approximatiue target realization. 
Policy anticipation is a central feature of the TPC approach. The optimization approach, 
implicitly, assumes that the policy lead s is zero, i.e. that the target path origin of the criterion 
function and the origin of the optimal policy are identical. Policy optimization implies that even 
in the case of TPC with s > 0 and zero adjustment costs on the instruments “the optimal policy’s 
insistence on no anticipation will compromise the objective in every period” (Preston and Sieper 
[5, p. 2491). TPC with lead s > 0, on the other hand, would imply that anticipation of the policy 
objective by s periods permits perfect achievement of the target path. 
3. THE SHORT-RUN MODEL 
3.1. The fixed-wage version 
Let us first consider an elementary static model in which the variables are expressed in logarithms 
(except the nominal interest rate r): 
y =d,+d,(g-p)-d,r (IS curve) (4) 
m-p =m,+m,y -mm2r (LM curve) (5) 
y = s, - s, (w -p) (supply function). (6) 
This log-linear short-run Keynesian model without technical progress contains three endogenous 
variables: real output y, the aggregate price level p, and the nominal interest rate r. The exogenous 
variables are nominal government spending g, the money supply m, and the nominal wage rate w. 
The coefficients of the model are assumed to be positive. 
The first equation is the equilibrium condition in the aggregate goods market. This IS-equation 
implicitly includes a macroeconomic consumption function, a tax function and an investment 
function. The coefficients d, and dz show the dependence of effective demand on real government 
expenditures on goods and services (g -p) and the interest rate. The second equation describes 
the equilibrium condition in the monetary sector: m - p is the real money supply and the Keynesian 
money demand function depends on y and r. The last equation represents a short-run macroeco- 
nomic supply function, which derives from a production function with constant capital stock and 
a labour demand function depending on the real wage rate w -p. 
Let real output y and the aggregate price level p be the target variables of the system. After 
eliminating the interest rate r via the LM-equation (5) we get the following simple decision model 
for the target vector (y,p)’ and the instrument vector (g, m)‘: 
C 
1+ dzm,lm,, dI +_;,/mj[;] = [;: dzp][;] + [“; !Tp]. 
1, 
c7j 
Controllability of economic systems under alternative xpectations hypotheses 621 
The first equation of the decision model combines equation (4) with (5) and represents the 
macroeconomic demand function: for constant values of g and m there is a negative relationship 
between real output and the price level. The second equation is the macroeconomic supply function 
in implicit form. 
Obviously, the coefficient matrix of the instrument vector (g, m)’ has no full rank. This implies 
that the target vector (y, p)’ is not statically controllable by means of the fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments g and m. This well-known result of a non-controllable decision model doesn’t mean 
that the policy maker is not able to attain a certain desired level of real output or the price level. 
Any of the two target variables is controllable with the given set of instruments, but only one of 
the values of the target variables y and p can be determined independently by the policy maker. 
The value of the other target variable depends on the fixed value of the chosen target variable. In 
the above decision model the two-dimensional target space contracts to a one-dimensional point 
set: the macroeconomic supply curve. 
Only points on the supply curve can be realized. This “dimensional defect in the space of target 
variables” (Kuhn [9]) would, of course, disappear, if the exogenous variable w could be used by 
the policy maker as an instrument oo. In this case a policy induced shift of the supply curve would 
be possible. As in most countries, the nominal wage rate is not available as a policy instrument. 
The target vector (y,p)’ is generally not controllable in the very short run (where the wages are 
fixed). This is a famous example of a non-controllable economic system. But there is no policy 
ineffectiveness in the sense that real output could not be influenced by fiscal or monetary policy. 
Stabilization policy should only take into consideration the trade-off between y and p. 
3.2. The macroeconomic model with endogenous wages 
Let us now give up the Keynesian hypothesis of a fixed nominal wage rate. If there is full price 
and wage flexibility (neoclassical hypothesis), in a world without technical progress the real wage 
rate w - p always will be given by the clearing of the labour market. In this important special case, 
according to equation (6), the real output will remain constant at a “natural 1evel”p. No instrument 
of demand management will then be able to change the level of real output. Only the price level 
p can be influenced by fiscal or monetary policy. Again, the decision model for the target vector 
(y,p)’ is not (statically) controllable. But, in contrast to the fixed-wage version of the model, all 
measures of demand management designed to vary real output are now ineffective. 
Until now, our model has been static and we have made no assumptions about expectations. 
Let us now consider the case where wages are neither fixed nor perfectly flexible, but adjust 
sluggishly according to an expectations-augmented Phillips curve for the labour market (A is the 
difference operator, for example, Aw,:=w, + , - w,, Ap: the expected inflation rate): 
Aw,=j,+j,y,+Ap:, io<O,j,>O. 
We will first assume rational inflationary expectations, i.e. 
Ap: = Ap,. 
(Note that in a deterministic model rational expectations are equivalent o perfect foresight.) The 
supply function then becomes the following dynamic equation: 
AY,= -s~(~+.&Y,) rev. Y,+) = -s,h+(l -s,j,)y,. 
This equation shows that real output is policy-invariant: neither fiscal nor monetary policy can 
influence the trend of y,. Inertia in the adjustment of nominal wages provides no scope for 
stabilization policy. Rational expectations lead, even in the case of a sluggish wage adjustment 
mechanism, to policy impotence concerning real output. Hence, the target vector (y,p)’ is not 
dynamically controllable although the price level p-analogous to the static model-can be 
controlled by demand management instruments. 
Let us now assume adaptive inflationary expectations, i.e. replace equation (9a) by the following 
hypothesis: 
Ap:=Ap:_,+I(Ap,_,-Ap:_,), Oc1Gl. (9b) 
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According to this equation the expected inflation rate in period t equals the expected inflation rate 
in period t - 1 plus a constant fraction of the expectational error in period t - 1. 
In the Appendix of this paper (Section A. 1), it is shown that in this case the target vector (y, p)’ 
is, at all events, target point controllable with policy lead one and local path controllable on target 
intervals with (maximum) length T + 1 = 2 and policy lead s = n = 2 (n = number of state 
variables). In other words, with the instruments g and m available, it is possible to reach, after two 
periods, any desired path of the target vector and to stay there for one further time period. 
Afterwards, the actual target path leaves the desired one but reaches it again after a further 
adjustment ime of two periods and so on. Thus, in the case of adaptive expectations, any given 
time path for the target vector (y, p)’ is only occasionally realizable, whereas in the case of rational 
expectation it is not at all attainable. 
To see that dynamic controllability in the case of adaptive expectations is possible, we have 
to consider the following short-run Lucas-type supply function which results from equations (6) 
and (7): 
Y,+ I = -s,h + (1 - M, )Y, + ~1 @A - 40 (10) 
With adaptive inflationary expectations, there exists a systematic expectational error 
(Ap, - Ap; # 0) and, therefore, it follows from the above supply function (10) that there will be a 
dynamic trade-off between y and p. Especially, real output is now no longer policy-invariant, but 
can be controlled by exploiting the expectational error. Since the price level can also be influenced 
by the policy instruments g and m it is not surprising that target point controllability is given. On 
the other hand, target path controllability for more than two periods does not hold. To see this 
consider the special case 1 = 1 in the expectations mechanism (9b), i.e. the case of static 
expectations. In this simplest case of autoregressive xpectations (Ap: = Lip,_ ,), the dynamic 
trade-off between y and p is given by 
J’r + I = -Jtjo+U -s,j,)y,+s,(P,+,-2P,+P,-,). 
This equation implies that the values of y,, p, + , , pI, and pI_ , uniquely determine the value of the 
real output in period t + 1. The policy maker is free to choose the values of the target vector (y, p)’ 
on the interval I = {t - 1, t}, but not on intervals with length 3, 4, and so on. Thus, target path 
controllability for a longer time interval is not given. Although there are as many instruments as 
targets the instrument variables g and m are not independent. The sequence of dynamic multipliers 
of g with respect to Cy,p)’ only differs from the corresponding sequence of the monetary policy 
instrument m up to a multiplicative constant. Hence, there is only one linear independent 
instrument variable so that the decision model becomes a model of the non-Tinbergen type which 
is locally path controllable for at most two periods (see equation (3) with n = k = 2, m = 1 and 
r = 1). 
Our analysis of the short-run models has revealed that there is no or almost no controllability 
if fiscal and monetary policy is combined to affect real output and the price level simultaneously. 
Only in the case of rational expectations real output y will be invariant if systematic demand 
management policies are pursued. In this case, not even target point controllability holds. It should 
be noticed that under a weak form of rational expectations target path controllability (in the global 
sense) holds in the short-run model. If expectations are formed in a manner that is consistent with 
the underlying model and if there are systematic expectational errors concerning the values of the 
exogenous instrument values, then the supply function depends on the policy instruments (via the 
price expectations error) so that TPC (target path controllability) holds (cf. Wohltmann [8]). A 
learning process of the private agents leading to a correct anticipation of the policy rules would, 
of course, lead to policy impotence again and therefore to an uncontrollable system. 
4. THE LONG-RUN MODEL 
In the long-run, we have to consider capacity effects, i.e. the influence of the capital stock in the 
equations of the model. Let k, be the log of the capital stock available in period t. We will assume 
that capital formation depends on the nominal interest rate, the stock of capital and the real output. 
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Then k, evolves according to the Keynesian “investment function” 
~k,=h-f,r,-f&,+_ih9 A>O. (11) 
This relationship must also be taken into account in the equation of the IS curve, so that the IS 
curve is now described by the equation 
(4a) 
(Note that the coefficients are not identical with the coefficients of the short-run model.) On the 
other hand, the capital stock is an additional argument in the aggregate supply function: 
Y, = so - $1 (w, -A) + S&t. (64 
A combination of the modified supply function and the equation of the Phillips curve (8) gives a 
Lucas-type aggregate supply function: 
Yl,l = -s,jo+(l -sf,)~,+s,(Ap,-Ap:)+s,(k,+, -0 (lOa) 
It is obvious that the whole structure of the model, compared with that of the short-run model, 
has changed. A change in the capital stock will now shift the macroeconomic supply function, and 
this displacement will not be independent of the net investment in the equation of the IS curve. 
Exploiting the dynamics of capital formation, the instruments g and m can move both the supply 
and demand curve over time, the latter given by the equation [cf. the first equation in (7)] 
(1 + dzml MY, = do - d2mo/mZ +d,g, + (d&Mm, - (d, + d,lm&, - d&,. (12) 
Since the shifts of the macroeconomic demand and supply function, respectively, depend on the 
same variable k, it is, at first sight, not clear whether dynamic controllability in the long-run case 
holds or not. Let us, therefore, analyse the details a little more. 
First consider the fixed-wage case, i.e. the model consisting of the equations (4a), (S), (6a), and 
(11). With fixed nominal wages the capital stock is the only state variable, and the output equations 
of the dynamic decision model are-in implicit form--the aggregate demand function (12) and the 
aggregate supply function (6a). Since the instrument variables act directly on the aggregate demand 
function, whereas the level of the macroeconomic supply function can only be shifted via changes 
of the capital stock, it is rather obvious that global path controllability is given if the accumulation 
of capital can be influenced by fiscal and monetary policy. This is indeed possible; thus, the 
fixed-wage discrete-time model is globally path controllable with policy lead one (cf. Kuhn and 
Wohltmann [lo] and Aoki and Canzoneri [l l] for the continuous-time case). By exploiting the 
dynamics in the model, the instrument variables g amd m are able to attain any desired time path 
for both target variables y and p for an indefinite time interval. After one period, the selected time 
path of the target vector (y, p)’ will be reached. Of course, a necessary condition for this result 
is the dependence of aggregate supply on the stock of capital k, i.e. s2 > 0. 
A closer analysis shows that this condition is not sufficient for the property of global path 
controllability in the case of fixed wages. If there were no influence of the interest rate on capital 
formation, i.e. if fi = 0 in (11) [this would imply d2 = 0 in (4a)], the connection between the 
monetary and the real sector would not exist and, therefore, the instrument variable m would be 
ineffective concerning real output and the price level, because neither the aggregate demand 
function nor the aggregate supply function would then be shifted by variations of the nominal 
money supply. The same consequences would be given for the existence of a liquidity trap (mz = co). 
In these two special cases we have, factually, a non-Tinbergen model, i.e. a model in which there 
exists only one true instrument variable, the nominal government spending on goods and services. 
Global path controllability would then be impossible and equation (3) for the maximum possible 
target interval implies that only target point controllability can hold (note that n = 1 in the 
fixed-wage case). It is not difficult to show that in the above-mentioned special cases point 
controllability (with policy lead s = n = 1) is given: an optimal point of target values is attainable 
in finite time but only for one single period (unless it would be an equilibrium state of the system). 
For stabilization policy this is not a very attractive property of a decision model. 
Now consider the whole long-run model (4a), (5), (6a), (8), (lla), and assume rational 
expectations in the Phillips curve for the labour market (A& = Ap,). Just as in the case of fixed 
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wages the long-run rational expectations model is globally path controllable too. The Lucas-type 
supply function for this hypothesis is now given by 
Y,+, = -s&+(1 -.r,j,)Y,+%(k,+, -k,), (lob) 
which implies that growth in the real output is determined by growth in the stock of capital. 
Controlling the formation of capital, real output can be influenced indirectly by fiscal and monetary 
policy. There is also a direct connection between the instruments of demand management and the 
price level. It is therefore not astonishing that this decision model is globally path controllable (see 
Section A.2 in the Appendix of this paper). Since in the short-run rational expectations model not 
even target point controllability holds, this outcome may be rather unanticipated. Note that only 
for the very special cases f, = d, = 0 or m2 = cc we get the same result as in the short-run model 
with rational expectations: a policy-invariant real output y. 
Finally, let us discuss the long-run model with adaptive expectations. By using the auxiliary 
(state) variable q, = Ap: - ip, we get a decision model with state equations for w, k and q, 
respectively, and two output equations for the target variables y and p. In this model, too, global 
path controllability (with policy lead one) is given (cf. Wohltmann [12] for the continuous-time 
case). This result is not surprising since now real output can not only be influenced via capital 
formation but also via the expectational error Ap, - Ap: [see equation (lOa)]. It is worth mentioning 
that global path controllability is independent of the value of 2 in the expectation formation process 
(9b) so that it also holds in the case A = 1 (static expectations). For the special cases f, = d2 = 0 
or m, = cc monetary policy again is totally ineffective, and the decision model with global path 
controllability will be replaced by a model which is only maximal controllable with policy lead 
s = n = 3 and a target interval of three periods. This result is similar to that of the short-run model 
with adaptive expectations because maximal controllability is a special form of local path 
controllability: after an adjustment ime of three periods it is possible to steer the economy for three 
time periods at best. 
In summary, the analysis of the different versions of the long-run model shows that, with the 
exception of some special cases, no policy ineffectiveness exists (see also Table 1 below). This 
outcome is independent of the respective xpectation assumption. Moreover, for any underlying 
expectations mechanism the target vector (y,p)’ is always globally path controllable by means of 
a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. This result is of great importance for the quantitative 
theory of economic policy: in a long-run macroeconomic model for a closed economy the 
traditional instruments of fiscal and monetary policy can be used to attain any optimal time path 
of the target variables y and p (via the control of capital formation), even under the assumption 
of rational inflationary expectations. 
Table I. Summary of the results 
Rational expectations 
Fixed-wage model model 
Adaptive expectations 
model 
Short-run case 
Long-run case 
/,=d,=Oorm,=cc 
in the long-run case 
static model; trade-off 
between y and p; no static 
controllability 
global path controllability 
with policy lead s = I 
“non-Tinbergen” model; 
target point controllability 
with lead s = I (m ineffective) 
y policy invariant; no target 
point controllability 
global path controllability 
with policy lead s = I 
)? policy invariant; no target 
point controllability 
local path controllability 
with s = n = 2 and T = I; g and 
m are not independent 
global path controllability 
with policy lead s = I 
“non-Tinbergen” model; 
maximal controllability 
with s = n = 3 and T* = I 
(m ineffective) 
5. THE CHALLENGE OF THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS THEORY 
The hypothesis that expectations are formed rationally is founded on very plausible assumptions 
about economic behaviour. If economic agents are rational, they will make full use of all available 
information when forming expectations o that the expected forecasting error is zero. Of course, 
“the information requirements for truly rational expectations are quite heroic, and there is 
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considerable doubt as to whether these requirements are met” (Carter and Maddock [13, p. 361). 
But we can take the rational expectations theory as a theoretical construction which plays a similar 
role as the model of perfect competition in describing economic reality. And, in our opinion, each 
policy model should be able to stand the test of incorporating such admittedly extreme assumptions 
about expectations because the learning process of the private agents will almost certainly go in 
the direction of the formation of rational expectations. 
Hence, we will take up the discussion once more and have a second look at a crucial point of 
the “new classical macroeconomics”: the definition of “natural output”. 
The already classical argument of the rational expectations school is that countercyclical 
stabilization policy cannot be used to stabilize fluctuations in real output because, if prices are 
exactly anticipated, the output is equal to the “natural output”. As we shall show, such an assertion 
depends in an essential way on the conception of “natural output”. 
The point of departure of our argumentation is the Lucas-type supply function we got from our 
model equations [see (lOa)]: 
Y,= -s&+(1 -sf,ly,-,+s,(Ap,-,--P:-,)+s,(k,-k,-,). 
If we define natural output J, as the real output which results from a time series where j,_ , equals 
y,_ , and no systematic expectation error exists, the natural or capacity output 7, will be given by 
the following relation: 
Yr= -s&+(1-s,i,)Y,-,+G,-k,-1). 
The “output relative to capacity” y, - 7, (McCallum [13, p. 727]), then, is easily seen to be 
yr-.E=s,@P,-, -APT-,)+(I -ci,Nyr-, -_?-,I. 
With rational expectations, the relative output y, - 1, is policy-invariant, although y, and jjl both 
are influenced by monetary and fiscal policy. 
Thus, for this definition of relative output, even in the long-run model there is no possibility to 
reach the ultimate goal of stabilization policy, namely to minimize the deviations of y, from 1,. 
This rather startling conclusion follows from the definition of natural output as a function of net 
investment and not of capital stock. 
Another possibility to define “natural output” is proposed by Barro [14]. He interprets 7, as “full 
information output”, i.e. an output that would directly come out of the assumption of rational 
expectations (without taking for granted that y,_ , must coincide with jj_ , ). In this case the 
“natural output” is 
Y,= -s&+(1 -s,j,)y,-,+S2(k,-k,-,). 
The “relative output” y, - jJ1 is now given by the equation 
Y, - Y, = SI CAP,- I - APT- I ). 
We see that also in this case the result is policy neutrality: the task to keep y, as close as possible 
to the “natural output” 7, cannot be performed by the instruments of demand management. Again, 
this consequence depends on the special definition of “natural output”. 
In our opinion, in a model without full wage flexibility, neither the first nor the second definition 
of “natural output” seems to be acceptable, since with sluggish wage adjustment 9, depends on the 
rate of change k, - k,_ , of the capital stock and not on k, (or k,_ , ) itself. We don’t see why an 
absolute quantity like pI should depend on Ak,_, and therefore on net investment. Theoretically, 
it is more sensible to define the “natural output” with Buiter [3, p. 44n], as “the full information 
level of output that would be produced if the labour market were to clear with the given stock of 
capital.” Following Friedman’s idea of a “natural rate of unemployment” which determines in the 
long-run the input of labour, it is quite natural to define “natural or capacity output” 7, as a 
function of the stock of capital (see also Canzoneri [16, p. 6421, and Begg [17, pp. 143-1441). 
If we make use of the definition 1, = s2 k,, the dynamic supply function is given by 
Y,= -s&+(1--s,j,)y,-,+s,(Ap,-,-AK-,)+Y,-.P-, 
and for the relative output y, - 7, we get the relation 
Y,-.P,= -s,j,+s,(Ap,-,-AP:-,)+(Y,-,-~,-,)-s,j,y,-,. 
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We see that the relative output is now a function of y, _ , . Since y,_ , is influenced by g,_ z and m,_ 2 
(via the control of capital formation) the relative output is not invariant concerning the instruments 
of demand management. It can be shown that the target vector (y, -I,, p,)’ is globally path 
controllable with policy lead 2 (Wohltmann [S]). 
Thus, there is no cause to think that, in the long-run model, the assumption of rational 
expectations is connected with policy impotence. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we tried to demonstrate that the concept of controllability is a very useful concept 
to analyse fixed target problems in the theory of economic policy. By means of the TPC approach 
it is possible to answer the question of how the transition from ad hoc to rational expectations 
modifies the structure of macroeconomic policy models. We have shown that the change from 
adaptive to rational expectations in simple decision models does not always deteriorate the 
controllability properties of macroeconomic systems and especially does not necessarily lead to 
policy ineffectiveness. “Policy neutrality is model dependent” (Preston and Pagan [2, p. 309]), and 
for each model you will have to investigate the structure of the policy problem, notwithstanding 
the special assumptions of expectation formation. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
REFERENCES 
R. Dombusch and S. Fischer, Macroeconomics, 3rd edn. McGraw-Hill, New York (1984). 
A. J. Preston and A. R. Pagan, The Theory of Economic Policy, Statics and Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1982). 
W. H. Buiter, The macroeconomics of Dr. Pangloss. A critical survey of the New Classical Macroeconomics. Econ. 
J. 90, 34-50 (1980). 
J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1952). 
A. J. Preston and E. Sieper, Policy objectives and instrument requirements for a dynamic theory of policy. In 
Applications of Conrrol Theory to Economic Analysis (Ed. J. D. Pitchford and S. J. Turnovsky), pp. 215-253. 
North-Holland, Amsterdam (1977). 
W. H. Buiter and M. Gersovitz, Issues in controllability and the theory of economic policy. J. public Econ. 15, 3343 
(1981). 
M. Aoki. On a mneralization of Tinbergen’s condition in the theory of policy to dynamic models. Rev. econ. Stud. 
42, 293-296 (1975). 
. _ . 
H.-W. Wohltmann, Quantitative Wirrschafispolitik bei alternativen Erwarfungen. Die Bedeutung der Erwartungsbildung 
fir die Steuerung und Stabilisierung offener Volkswirtschaften. Lang, Frankfurt (1987). 
9. H. Kuhn, Dimensionsdefekte in der Stabilisierungspolitik. Zur Logik des wirtschaftspolitischen “Zielkonflikts”. 
Z. Nationaliikon. 35, 391-420 (1975). 
10. H. Kuhn and H.-W. Wohltmann, Statische und dynamische Steuerbarkeit wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsmodelle. 
In Angewandfe Wirtschaffs- und Sozialkybernetik (Ed. B. Schiemenz and A. Wagner). Schmidt, Berlin (1984). 
11. M. Aoki and M. Canzoneri, Sufficient conditions for control of target variables and assignment of instruments in 
dynamic macroeconomic models. Inf. econ. Rev. 20, 605-616 (1979). 
12. H.-W. Wohltmann. On the controllabilitv of continuous-time macroeconomic models. 2. Nationallikon. 45, 47-66 
(1985). 
13. M. Carter and R. Maddock, Rational Expectations. Macroeconomics of the 198&s? Macmillan, London (1984). 
14. B. T. McCallum, Rational expectations and macroeconomic stabilization policy. An overview. J. Money Credit Banking 
12, 716-746 (1980). 
15. R. J. Barro, Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy. J. monetary Econ. 2, l-32 (1976). 
16. M. B. Canzoneri, The role of monetary and fiscal policy in the new classical models. S. econ. J. 44, 642647 (1977). 
17. D. K. H. Begg, The Rational Expectations Revolution in Macroeconomics. Theories and Evidence. Allan, Oxford (1982). 
18. H.-W. Wohltmann and W. Kriimer, Sufficient conditions for dynamic path controllability of economic systems. J econ. 
Dynam. Confrol 7, 315-330 (1984). 
APPENDIX 
A. 1. The Shorl-run Decision Model with Adaptive Expectations 
If we assume adaptive expectations in the equation for the Phillips curve this equation becomes [cf. equation (8)] 
w,+,=w,+jo+j,y,+~Ap,_,+~l-E.~~pp:_,. 
This is not a very convenient form. Therefore, we introduce as an auxiliary variable the state variable q, = ApP: - i.p,. Using 
this variable we get an expression for Ap;: 
APP: = q, + APP,. 
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The Phillips curve can then be written as 
w,+,=w,+jo+j,Y,+q,+~~P,, 
and the adaptive expectations hypothesis can be expressed in terms of q: 
qr+,=(1-4q,-~2p,. 
The output equations for the target variables y and p are given in implicit form by the macroeconomic demand function 
and the aggregate supply function [see formula (7)]. Solving these equations for y, and p, and inserting the resulting 
expressions in the equations for w,+ , and q,+ , we get a dynamic decision model in the state space form (I), (2): 
with 
a,, = 1 -j,s,6-‘(mrd, +d2)+ ~,s-‘(m,+d,m,), 
0,~ = -12S-‘~,(m2 + d,m,), 6 =s,(m,+ d,m,) +m,d, + d2; 
with 
cl = s, (d0m2 - d2m0) + s0(m2d, + d2), 
c2 =&m, - d2m, - s,(m, + d,m,). 
Let B and D be the instrument coefficient matrices in the state and output equations, respectively. Note that the composite 
4 x 2 matrix 
B [I D 
has not full rank two but only rank one (the first column is a fraction of the second one). This implies that the relative 
lag-j-multiplier of g with respect o (y,p)’ coincides for each j = 0, 1, 2,. . with the corresponding relative multiplier of 
m: 
a~, ap, a~, 8~~ _ -=- 
i 
- 
ag,-, ag,-, i am,_j am,_j’ 
j = 0, 1, 2, . . . 
The control variables g and m are therefore linear dependent so that the above decision model is factually of the 
non-Tinbergen type. Such a model is at most locally path controllable. 
As is well-known (Preston and Sieper [S]), the discrete-time dynamical system (I), (2), is dynamically controllable on time 
intervals with length T + I if there exists a policy lead s 6 n (n = number of state variables) such that the 
(T + 1)/c x (T + s + 1)m matrix R(T, s): 
I 
D CB CAB ... CA’-‘B CATS ... CAT+“-IB 
0 D CB ..’ CAT-2B CAT-,B . . . CA T+s-zB 
W,s)= : : : .., : . . 
. . 
0 0 0 .‘. D CB ... CA’-‘B 
fulfhls the condition 
rank R(T, s) = (T + 1)k. 
Note that in non-Tinbergen models maximal controllability is given if the above rank condition holds for T = T* where 
the parameter T* (which is less than the number n of state variables) is defined by equation (3). 
In the above decision model with adaptive expectations we have one linear independent instrument variable, for example 
g. Let B,(resp. 0,) be the coefficient vector of g in the instrument coefficient matrix B (resp. D). Then the point 
controllability matrix R(0, 1) = (0, , CB,) = 
6-I sI d, m2 
[ 
-6-‘s,(m,d, +d2)d,m2(j,s, +A) 
d, m2 -6-,12s,(m,+d2m,)d,m2 1 
has full rank 2 so that target point controllability with policy lead s = 1 holds. 
To show that even local path controllability (maximal controllability) with T* + 1 = 2 and s = n = 2 is given we must 
compute the 4 x 4 matrix R(T*, s) = R(l, 2) = 
[ 
D, CB, CAB, CA2B, 
0 D, CB, 1 CAB, ’ 
For reasons of space we will not present the path controllability matrix here. It should only be pointed out that after a 
long and rather tedious calculation it can be shown that R( 1,2) has full rank 4; therefore, local path controllability with 
T* + 1 = 2 and s = 2 holds. 
A.2. The Long-run Decision Model with Rational Expectations 
We have two state variables, the capital stock k and the real wage rate hl= w -p. The output equations for the target 
variables y and p are-as in the short-run case-implicitly given by the macroeconomic demand function and the aggregate 
supply function. 
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The dynamic decision model consists of the following equations: 
with 
I, = l/(d,m,+d,), 
Note that 
4, =’ -.fi+~z(f?-f;~,/~,)+(~~,/~,)(SI(M2+d,m,)+d,m,), 
~lz=~,(~-fim,:~,)+(.fi~,/m,)~,(~,+d,m,), 
c3 =h -.Lmo/m2 + C/3 -hm,/m,h+ (fi7,/m,)(~o(m2+d2m,) +d,m,-d,m,), 
c~=T,(-s,~ +d,,mz-d,m,), 
a = mz + c&m,. 
rank 
B [I D = 2; 
i.e. the instruments g and m are independent [B and D are defined as in (l), (2)]. A sufficient condition for global path 
controllability is given by (cf. Preston and Pagan [2] and Wohltmann and Krijmer [18]) 
rank 
D CB 
[ 1 0 D - rank D = 2 ( = number of target variables) 
It is not difficult to show that the first matrix has rank 3 and the impact multiplier matrix D rank 1; therefore, global (in 
T) path controllability holds. The policy lead is one period. 
